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ABSTRACT
The Controller Area Network (CAN) in vehicles provides serial
communication between electronic control units that manage en-
gine, transmission, steering and braking. Researchers have recently
demonstrated the vulnerability of the network to cyber-attacks
which can manipulate the operation of the vehicle and compromise
its safety. Some proposals for CAN intrusion detection systems,
that identify attacks by detecting packet anomalies, have drawn
on one-class classification, whereby the system builds a decision
surface based on a large number of normal instances. The one-class
approach is discussed in this paper, together with initial results
and observations from implementing a classifier new to this field.
The Compound Classier has been used in image processing and
medical analysis, and holds advantages that could be relevant to
CAN intrusion detection.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Vehicle cybersecurity will become more important with the rise
of autonomous and connected vehicles [19]. The vulnerability of
vehicles to cyber-attack has been demonstrated in staged attacks
[4, 8, 9] that focussed on the in-vehicle Controller Area Network
(CAN). An attack on this network could incapacitate the vehicle,
control it, or compromise its safety.
Preventive measures have been proposed (e.g. [14, 15]), although
full assurance from attack is difficult to achieve, especially consider-
ing the architecture and functionality of the CAN, which is designed
for speed and robustness, rather than security and authentication.
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Therefore, CAN security also requires the development of a viable,
practicable intrusion detection system (IDS) so that ameliorative
action can be taken as soon as an attack is detected [10].
Attack detection on computer networks falls broadly into two
approaches: signature matching, and anomaly detection [3]. Sig-
nature approaches match traffic patterns against known attacks.
They can offer low error rates and can helpfully classify the attacks.
However, they rely on the ability to capture an attack model, encode
it, and update the client database; all before the newly identified
attack has time to proliferate.
Anomaly approaches detect anomalies in the network traffic,
the assumption being that these might indicate an attack. Such ap-
proaches are more prone to detecting false positives, however, their
non-reliance on known attack signatures makes them appealing in
novel or unpredictable situations, such as the emerging field of in-
vehicle cybersecurity. Anomaly detection methods proposed for the
automotive CAN include statistical approaches [5], legitimate state
transitions [17], k-Nearest Neighbours [11], and Support Vector
Machines and Neural Networks [18]. Because the unpredictability
of future attack scenarios makes predicting an attack class difficult,
some researchers have proposed a one-class classification approach
[10, 18].
A classifier that might be beneficial is the Compound Classifier
proposed by Batchelor [1, 2]. This is able to generalise, learn, make
rapid decisions, and can be adapted for one-class problems [2].
Devised for machine vision and colour recognition, it has also been
used in medical diagnostic devices [1].
This paper presents initial findings from building a Compound
Classifier, and the early testing of it using CAN data. The rest of
the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the CAN, its
vulnerability and requirements for intrusion detection. Section 3
states the reasons for considering CAN intrusion detection as a one-
class problem. The one-class Compound Classifier is explained in
Section 4. Initial testing, results and observations from building the
Compound Classifier are presented in section 5. Finally, conclusions
and future work are discussed in Section 6.
2 VEHICLE CONTROLLER AREA NETWORK
Vehicles are increasingly connecting to external networks through
Bluetooth, cellular, or internet technologies. The connectedness of
vehicles is likely to rise with increases in vehicle-to-vehicle and
vehicle-to-internet networks, and autonomous vehicles, increasing
the risk of cyber-attack, especially to the CAN [19].
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2.1 CAN Overview
The CAN supports the electronic control units (ECUs) for the vehi-
cle’s core systems such as braking, steering, engine management,
and transmission. Its protocol was formulated for fast, fault-tolerant
data exchange, at a time when vehicles were isolated and security
was not an issue. Consequently, it has properties that now seem
inherent security weaknesses [8]:
• CAN packets are broadcast to all nodes, so a malicious node
could listen to all the traffic, or broadcast to all other nodes.
• CAN has a priority-based arbitration scheme that might
allow a malicious node to dominate the bus indefinitely.
• CAN packets have no authenticator field or source identifier,
so a malicious node could indistinguishably send packets to
the other nodes.
2.2 CAN Vulnerability
The vulnerability of the CANhas been highlighted by staged attacks,
for example:
• Sniffing CAN packets via the OBD port, examining, altering
and reinjecting them to control the braking and engine [8].
• Compromising the CAN through Bluetooth and cellular net-
works, CD-based firmware updates, and music files [4, 9].
• Injecting phoney CANmessages to control braking, steering,
and acceleration at speed [12].
Proposals to reduce CAN vulnerability fall into two broad camps:
i) security improvements such as authentication or access control;
and, ii) intrusion detection systems (IDS) that quickly detect an
attack so that ameliorative action can be taken. Both approaches are
warranted, although costs, production chains, component develop-
ment speed and safety priorities, form an obstacle to implementing
security improvements requiring CAN modification [8].
2.3 CAN Intrusion Detection
Attributes in CAN packet flows that have been explored for patterns
that might indicate attacks are: frequency [10], data content change
[10], time intervals [16], and clock skews between nodes [5]. The
common factor in these studies is that they have sought an anomaly
detection approach.
It is likely that a viable CAN IDS would need an ensemble of
detection methods, providing a consensus decision. For example,
[18] propose an attack in which a compromised ECU broadcasts
malicious messages to the Keep Lane Assist system, nudging the
car off road. The messages would appear legitimate, with plausible
values; and would only be seen to be anomalous in the context
of data from other devices. We are therefore exploring a range of
anomalies, including anomalies to the data payload. In particular,
we are interested in classifiers that compare data from multiple
sources and treat intrusion detection as a one-class problem.
3 ONE-CLASS CLASSIFICATION
In one-class classification, training data from normal operation is
analysed during learning and a threshold boundary determined,
within which reside the normal instances. Subsequent instances
that fall beyond this threshold are flagged as anomalies, i.e. an
attack in the case of an IDS.
According to [18], one-class classification is well-suited for a
CAN IDS because the CAN packet flow is predictable and constant.
Also, one-class classification might be preferred where training
data instances of anomalous behaviour are difficult to generate
or predict, or where the formulation of an anomalous class might
be too restrictive to enable generalisation or application across
multiple cases not available at training (such as in a biometric
security system that needs to detect all candidates who are not the
authorised individual) [20]. These are qualities pertinent to CAN
intrusions, where the potential variety of the attack modes and the
complex lifecycle of the vehicle, suggests it would be unwise to
assume knowledge of the entire range of attacks.
4 COMPOUND CLASSIFIER
Methods proposed for one-class classification include: one-class sup-
port vector machines and neural networks of various types, proba-
bility estimations, decision trees, and nearest neighbour methods
[7]. The method explored here is the Compound Classifier devised
by Batchelor [1, 2], which is based on Euclidean distance and near-
est neighbour analysis. Advantages of the Compound Classifier
stated by Batchelor are:
• It lends itself well to visualisation, important for understand-
ing and checking.
• It is suitable for dimensional analysis, where the decision sur-
face can be represented as circles, spheres or hyperspheres.
• It has been implemented in fast hardware, and can be scaled
by combining.
The Compound Classifier requires that data is numeric, and nor-
malised to give each dimension parity. Vectors need to offer a good
range of discriminatory attributes. In the case of the CAN this might
be packet frequency, time between packets, message priority, or
data payload values which our study used.
4.1 Decision Making by Compound Classifier
Distance between instances can be used as an indication of their
similarity. The Euclidean distance D between any two vectors U =
(U1, . . . ,Uq ) and V = (V1, . . . ,Vq ) can be calculated as:
D(U ,V ) =
√√ q∑
j=1
(Uj −Vj )2 (1)
Although distance-based nearest neighbour analysis might be
used for deciding whether an instance falls into either of two classes,
it can not be used in its pure form for one-class determination, and
might be prone to over-fitting, where the classifier follows the train-
ing set boundary too tightly, losing the capacity to generalise to
the population. Also, there are considerable overheads in searching
the full dataset when making each prediction. Therefore the Com-
pound Classifier reduces the decision surface into a set of circles
(for a vector having two attributes), spheres (three attributes) or
hyperspheres (four or more attributes), which between them cover
the instances in the training set1. Decision making compares the
coordinates of the target instance against the centre coordinates
and radius of each sphere. If the target instance falls within any
1The term "sphere" is used in the rest of this paper for convenience. Clearly the shape
will depend on the dimensionality of the vector.
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sphere, it is classed as normal. If it falls outside all spheres, it is
classed as an anomaly. Thus, the decision of the classifier is given
by:
M = siдn{maxi=1...N [Fi − D2(Bi ,X )]} (2)
Here N is the size of the set of spheres, F i is the radius of the ith
sphere and Bi is the centre of the ith sphere, D2() is the Euclidean
distance as defined in (1), X is the target vector we wish to classify.
X is determined as a normal class member ifM is positive or zero,
and an anomaly ifM is negative.
4.2 Training the Compound Classifier
Training the Compound Classifier uses the above equations, and
involves adjusting the size and location of each sphere. The training
set is processed for a few iterations, with the training data shuffled
between each to reduce the risk of systematic biases within the
time sequence of the data. During training, for each instance X :
i) IfM is negative, the nearest sphere is moved towards X and
is made larger. All other spheres are made smaller.
ii) If M is positive, X lies within one or more spheres. Those
spheres are moved towards X and made smaller. All other
spheres are made smaller [2].
The values for the sphere movement and the size-change are kept
small to enhance the accuracy of the classifier, and are suggested
in [1, 2], together with the desired numbers of training examples,
training iterations, and initial spheres. Batchelor also devised pro-
cesses for adding and pruning spheres to give efficient coverage of
the training data set. As more spheres are added, the classification
space could become messy, so methods are proposed to remove
spheres nested inside other spheres, and divide large spheres that
reduce the classifiers compactness and discernibility.
At the start of training, the initial sphere centres could use the
location of any candidate instances. However, randomly assigned
centres might not be optimal starting points. An alternative is
to choose a subset of instances that are furthest apart, ensuring
the initial spheres are spread throughout the data space. However,
this might favour lone outliers, which again might be suboptimal.
Therefore, following analyses conducted by [13], the Compound
Classifier adopts "Maximindist", which combines nearest neighbour
measurements with probability density function estimates, to locate
the initial sphere centres close to cluster centres.
5 EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS
A Compound Classifier following specifications in [1, 2] was built
using Python on a standard laptop. Python holds the advantage of
being implementable on small single-board computers, such as the
Raspberry Pi, which could be used for testing in situ. Initial analysis
used three data fields captured from the CAN log of a journey lasting
a few minutes. Data values were averaged over 0.1 second slots,
enabling the data fields to be combined into an array with three
columns, one per field, and nearly 6000 records, one per 0.1 second.
The fields comprised a small subset of those identified within the
CAN log (28 packet-types, each with up to eight data fields), but
were chosen because their data clearly represented sensor data, i.e
the values showed steady change and had a large range of values.
The data was taken from packets having three separate CAN IDs,
so probably came from three different ECUs. Manufactures do not
Figure 1: Compound Classifier on completion of train-
ing sufficient to enclose 95% of instances. During training
spheres have grown andmoved, and new spheres added. The
training data is shown as dark points.
publish their CAN specifications, including the meaning of the
data, how values are derived, and the broadcast triggers. However,
matching the values in the fields to driving events suggested they
were connected to the speed of the car, throttle position, or some
related aspect of engine output.
Fig. 1 includes the normalised values for the data fields plotted
against each other. They show a complex correlation, with amixture
of clusters and thin, twisting, filaments. This might make them chal-
lenging for a classifier, including the Compound Classifier which
has been used in applications such as colour recognition, where
instances tend to describe a simpler, more globular, clustering.
The spheres in Fig. 1 are the classifier on completion of training
sufficient to enclose 95% of training instances. Training took a
few minutes, with the classifier osculating in the 90% region for
many of the iterations. The 95% level seems to be the maximum
that the classifier in its original form can reach with this data set.
We curtailed attempts to achieve higher levels when the classifier
showed no improvement after running for many iterations.
As can be seen in Fig. 1, a few clusters remain outside spheres.
Nearly 5% of training data points remained outside of the classifier
and would incorrectly be classified as anomalies, hence potential
attacks. We tested the classifier against data from another journey,
and obtained a similar classification rate. CAN packets are broadcast
at a high rate, so this would correspond to many false positives per
second. A CAN IDS would clearly have to achieve false positive
rates far lower than this. Changes to the training algorithm (such
as ensuring added sphere locates are outside the existing classifier
surface), or adjustments to the training parameters, might improve
the classifier. This would require empirical research.
Testing the ability of a classifier to detect attack data presents
challenges. For example, one type of attack demonstrated on the
CAN involves injecting packets with fuzzed data; that is, data values
that are random [9]. This attackmight be done to confuse the system
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or to test the system responses. Mimicking the values that might
be used by a naive attacker, we separately fuzzed each field in a
test sample using randomly generated values relevant to the bit-
size capacity of the field. The classifier was poor at detecting this
attack, managing to classify only 65%, 52% and 45% of attack records
depending on which field was fuzzed. Fig. 1 shows large voids in
some of the spheres whichwould contribute tomisclassification.We
repeated this with training and test data from another journey, but
results were similar. These results seem poor, although a fuzzing
attack will inevitably produce some records that fall within the
cluster of normal data. Thus a perfect detection rate is elusive. That
said, comparing different types of classifier against the same data
set would determine which showed the most discerning decision
surface.
6 CONCLUSION AND FURTHERWORK
CAN intrusion detection warrants being treated as a one-class prob-
lem. The long life of vehicles, their divergent maintenance scenarios,
the diversity of currently envisaged attacks, and newness of the
field, suggest unforeseen attack modes will emerge. Studies have
identified CAN attributes that might indicate an attack, including
time intervals between packets and number of packets broadcast in
unit time. More challenging is the detection of manipulated packet
payload, since this can present values that might be legitimate in
other driving contexts. The Compound Classifier could offer utility
by detecting anomalies in one ECU sensor-reading when compared
against others. Its qualities include: producing a decision struc-
ture that lends itself to visual inspection; the ability to generalise,
and the reduction of the normal data set into a smaller number of
spheres enabling rapid classification.
In our initial tests, a Compound Classifier determined boundaries
around a class comprising three CAN data fields that had a complex
correlation pattern. However, the class boundaries still left many
instances incorrectly classified. We have yet to explore whether
improvements could be made by adjusting the training parameters
or algorithm. So far, we have tested the classifier with only three
dimensions of sensor readings, representing only a small part of
the data fields broadcast within the CAN. Attacks might involve
any of these, so an IDS would need to be configured accordingly.
Methods, such as one-class SVMs, are worth considering in com-
parison, and benefit from broader empirical testing, as well as pre-
built packages in tools such as Python and R. A CAN IDS is likely to
need an ensemble of detection methods, each optimal for a specific
task. We will therefore be comparing a range of methods.
We have only tested the classifier on a single type of attack —
fuzzing, in which the CAN packet is flooded with random data.
Attacks that involve plausible data (e.g. mis-broadcasting the angle
of the wheels for a lane assist system) might be even harder to
detect since the attack data is likely to reside closer to the heart
of the normal class. Also problematical is our current reliance on
simulating an attack by manipulating previously captured output
logs, which presents a simplistic rendition. This problem is common
to other studies in this field, since cyber-attacking a actual car is
costly and dangerous. Here, developments in simulation test rigs,
such as those proposed by [6], are promising, and we are looking
at how to validate them and integrate them into our research.
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